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 The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency
 By HARVEY E. LAPAN*
 The optimal tariff for a large country equals the reciprocal of the foreign export
 elasticity of supply. However, if production decisions occur before consumption
 decisions, the ex ante optimal tariff is not time consistent because the ex post
 elasticity is less than the ex ante elasticity. We show all countries are worse off if
 the large country cannot precommit to its ex ante optimal tariff, and that all
 countries can gain if the large country taxes domestic production of importables.
 It is well known that a large country can
 increase domestic welfare through trade
 restrictions. In particular, the optimal
 ad valorem tariff rate on imports equals the
 reciprocal of the foreign export price elastic-
 ity of supply. The operational problems with
 this formula are that the relevant elasticity is
 not a constant (as it varies along the offer
 curve) and it will, in general, depend upon
 the appropriate time perspective.
 For example, assume a time lag between
 production and trade decisions, and that the
 home country is "large." From an ex ante
 perspective, the elasticity of foreign export
 supply depends upon both foreign supply
 and demand elasticities, whereas the ex post
 (given production choices) foreign export
 supply elasticity depends only upon prefer-
 ences, and hence will be less elastic than the
 ex ante export supply schedule. Accordingly,
 domestic policymakers, attempting to cap-
 italize on the home economy's greater market
 power, will have an incentive to set ex post
 tariffs at a higher level than they would if
 they could irrevocably precommit themselves
 to an ex ante tariff.
 Foreign and domestic producers, aware of
 the tariff rule used (without precommitment)
 will adjust their production decisions accord-
 ingly. Consequently, both countries will be
 worse off in the situation, where tariffs are
 set ex post, in accord with the short-run
 export supply elasticity, than they would be
 if tariffs were set ex ante. This dilemma is
 akin to the now familiar issue of time con-
 sistency in macro models: the inability of the
 government to (believably) precommit itself
 to a known policy can lead to a suboptimal
 outcome. Recent papers by Jonathan Eaton
 and Gene Grossman (1985) and by Robert
 Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1987) address
 the issue of time consistency in models in
 which tariffs are used as second-best policy
 instruments.'
 The political reasons why the (current)
 government does not, or cannot, precomnit
 itself (or future governments) to a prede-
 termined tariff is not the main focus of this
 paper. Nevertheless, it should be clear that,
 in any dynamic setting, a large country will
 always have an ex post incentive to increase
 tariffs above the ex ante optimal level. Thus,
 unless legislation or treaties can be imple-
 mented that prohibit (future) governments
 from changing tariffs, the optimal ex ante
 tariff is not a credible, time-consistent solu-
 2 tion.
 *Department of Economics, Iowa State University,
 Ames, Iowa 50011. I am indebted to Walt Enders, and
 two anonymous referees, for valuable comments and
 suggestions. Remaining errors are my responsibility.
 'Both papers focus on the ability of tariffs to redis-
 tribute income and both assume incomplete (insurance)
 markets. Eaton and Grossman report, based on numeri-
 cal methods, that the optimal and time-consistent solu-
 tions are similar. The Staiger-Tabellin model indicates
 that the time-consistent solution leads to (more) protec-
 tion.
 2Reputational considerations may cause the ex post
 tariff to be set closer to the ex ante optimal level as the
 large country government attempts to persuade foreign
 producers that it will not exploit the inelasticity of the
 ex post offer curve. However, if reputation is not trans-
 ferable between governments, these reputational consid-
 395
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Wed, 14 Sep 2016 14:31:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 396 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 1988
 The plan of our paper is as follows. In
 Section I we present the basic model, derive
 the time-consistent tariff, and compare it
 with the optimal tariff. In Section II we show
 that, due to the second-best nature of the
 time-consistent tariff, a production tax on
 importables in the large country can benefit
 all countries. We also compare the time-con-
 sistent tariff/tax equilibrium with the opti-
 mal and time-consistent solutions from Sec-
 tion I. The Appendix contains proofs of
 these propositions.
 I. The Optimal and the Time-Consistent Tariff
 Our analysis utilizes the standard two-good
 (M, F) trade model, with well-behaved pref-
 erences and technology. There are a large
 number of small, identical foreign countries
 that pursue free trade policies. The domestic
 economy is large, and would, under free
 trade, export M (the numeraire). All private
 agents act as price takers, but the domestic
 government utilizes commercial policy to in-
 crease domestic welfare.
 The distinguishing characteristic of our
 model is its focus on the timing of economic
 decisions, which are made in the following
 sequence: (i) the domestic government an-
 nounces the tariff rate on imports (of F);
 (ii) domestic and foreign production deci-
 sions are made based upon producer prices
 expected to prevail when trade/consump-
 tion decisions are made; (iii) the govern-
 ment may revise its announced tariff prior to
 trade decisions; and (iv) finally, trade (and
 consumption) decisions are made and car-
 ried out, given the predetermined production
 levels and tariff rate.
 Given our assumption of full information,
 the key assumption is not merely the pro-
 duction lag, but more importantly the ability
 of the government to revise tariffs once pro-
 duction decisions are made (step (iii)). If, in
 step (i), the government could credibly pre-
 commit to a tariff (thereby abolishing step
 (iii)) then, despite the production "lag," our
 model, and results, would reduce to those of
 the standard optimal tariff literature. How-
 ever, if the government can change tariffs
 after production decisions are made, step (i)
 is essentially irrelevant, and the standard
 optimal tariff will not be time consistent.
 This time inconsistency of the optimal tariff
 arises not only in the presence of production
 lags (as for agricultural markets, with spring
 plantings and fall harvest), but also in a
 dynamic model in which ex ante and ex post
 supply elasticities differ. In essence, pre-
 commitment means that the current govern-
 ment can set tariff rates for all time, and
 can preclude future governments from ever
 changing these rates. If the current govern-
 ment cannot exercise such authority, then
 the (dynamic) optimal tariff will not be time
 consistent.3
 We now turn to our formal model. Let p
 and p, respectively, denote the foreign, and
 domestic, relative (consumer) price of F.
 Similarly, pa and pf' denote the relative
 price foreign, and domestic, producers of F
 expect (to receive for their output) when
 production decisions are made. In a perfect
 foresight equilibrium, pa = p and ps = p (if
 no domestic production tax/subsidies are
 used).
 The (aggregate) foreign supply and de-
 mand curves have their usual properties, with
 the exception that supply depends upon price
 expectations, whereas demand depends upon
 realized income and realized price. Foreign
 income (y) is given by
 (1) 3(PsP-a) Sm(pa)+pS (pa)q
 erations will be unimportant. Also, under uncertainty, if
 state-contingent tariffs were not feasible, precommitting
 to a fixed ex ante tariff would not be optimal. Thus, if
 production lags are present, and if additional informa-
 tion is available once production decisions are made,
 the choice between ex ante and ex post tariffs involves
 ranking second-best policies.
 3I emphasize the implausibility of precommitting to
 the optimal tariff because several readers of an earlier
 version of this paper thought it important to explain
 why precommitment did not occur. While this would be
 an interesting exercise in political economy, my main
 point is that precommitment would matter. Moreover,
 since I know of no case in which a government is
 irrevocably committed to an announced tariff (or any
 other economic) policy, the time-consistency issue seems
 germane.
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 where Si denotes the foreign supply schedule
 for good i. Given foreign demand for F
 (F( y, p)), the foreign export supply curve is
 () X( ppa) _S( -a)-Fy-
 The slope of the ex ante foreign export
 supply curve (denoted X') is derived assum-
 ing dp = dpia (and p -a), whereas the slope
 of the ex post export supply curve (denoted
 dX/ d) assumes foreign production is fixed
 (dpa = 0):
 (3) ( d X/@l) =- + f -(pa)]
 =('S;' at -a=
 where Fp, Fy denote partial differentiation of
 demand, and S ( > 0) is the slope of the
 foreign supply curve.
 Turning to the domestic economy, domes-
 tic production (denoted Si(pa)) depends on
 anticipated producer prices, while domestic
 demand depends upon the consumer price
 and realized income. Domestic income is
 (4) Y= Sm(pa) + pSj(pa)
 + ( -p){F(y, p) - f(Psa)} a
 where F(y, p) denotes domestic demand for
 F, and the tariff revenue (the latter term in
 (4)) is rebated in a lump-sum fashion to
 households. Using the standard representa-
 tive agent assumption, we let V(y, p) denote
 the indirect utility function for domestic
 agents; domestic demand is derived from
 this using Roy's identity.
 The equilibrium trade condition is given
 by
 (5) F(y, p)-S-f (pa) = X( a).
 The standard optimal tariff formula is de-
 rived by maximizing V(y, p), using (1)-(5)
 and assuming pa p pSa_ p (i.e., assuming
 perfect foresight, no production subsidies,
 and that tariffs are set before production
 decisions are made). Performing this optimi-
 M
 E A
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 FIGURE 1. THE OPTIMAL TARIFF AND THE
 TiME-CONSISTENT TARIFF
 zation yields the familiar result4
 (6) {dV(y, p)/dp} = VY[ - X+ tX'] =O;
 t- (p -P).
 Denote this optimal ex ante solution by
 (p0,p ). As noted earlier, this solution is
 not time consistent if tariff rates may be
 changed once production decisions are made
 since the ex post foreign offer curve is less
 elastic than the ex ante curve. This time
 inconsistency is shown in Figure 1, where
 OMBA represents the ex ante foreign offer
 curve, and GJBH the domestic economy's
 (ex ante) trade indifference curve. The point
 B denotes the optimal trade point, with world
 price (p?) given by the slope of ray OBC,
 and domestic price (p?) given by the slope
 of the common tangent (not shown) at B.
 4Formally, we use foreign price, not the tariff, as the
 choice variable. If there is a unique equilibrium for each
 tariff, the two instruments are equivalent. However, if
 there are multiple equilibria for some tariffs (as may
 happen if the foreign offer curve is bending backward),
 then there is no guarantee that the "optimal" tariff will
 cause the "correct" equilibrium to emerge. For this
 case, setting world price is a superior instrument. Suffi-
 cient second-order conditions to (6) are convex domes-
 tic preferences, concave domestic technology, and a
 concave (ex ante) foreign offer curve.
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 Given foreign production decisions (based
 on p?), the ex post foreign offer curve is less
 elastic, as shown by the curve DJTBE. While
 the trade point B is still obtainable, it is not
 optimal from the domestic perspective. Given
 foreign production, the ex post optimum oc-
 curs at a point like T, with lower foreign
 price (higher tariff) than at B.5 While T
 seemingly results in higher domestic welfare
 than B, it is not a time-consistent solution
 since foreign producers' price expectations
 are incorrect. Unless the domestic govern-
 ment can irrevocably precommit to its
 ex ante optimal tariff, the ex ante optimum
 (B) is not obtainable.
 The time-consistent solution requires that
 producers' price expectations be correct and
 that the ex post price (tariff) set by the home
 government be optimal, given the ex post
 offer curve. Graphically, this time-consistent
 equilibrium is represented in Figure 1 by
 point M, where (i) the ex post foreign offer
 curve (LMN) is tangent to the (relevant)
 domestic trade indifference curve (RMS),
 and (ii) the equilibrium occurs along the
 ex ante foreign offer curve. This time-con-
 sistent solution results in lower world price,
 lower foreign welfare, and lower domestic
 welfare.
 Formally, the time-consistent, no precom-
 mitment solution is derived as follows. Using
 (1)-(3), equations (4) and (5) determine
 domestic income (y) and price (p) as func-
 tions of foreign price (pi), and prede-
 termined output levels (i.e., price expecta-
 tions). For subsequent analysis, we totally
 differentiate (4) and (5):
 (7) dy= [{Fpbl+(F+tFp)b2 }/3];
 t[ (pF-PF)<
 (8) dp = - Fy (bl) + (I - tFY) b2 }1]
 A[Fp +FFy] < Os
 where 18 is the slope of the domestic com-
 pensated demand for importables, and we
 define
 (9) bl,[ X.dP +O.dp-a
 +(P--Pa)Sl dps],
 (I10) b-[ pX/ ) *d
 + (s. dp-a) + (S .dpsa)]
 Optimizing domestic utility (V( y, p)), over
 p-, given output levels (price expectations)
 yields
 av ay dp
 (11) -= y a_ + p a_
 ax]
 =VY[-X(P Pa)+t. J=0.
 Equations (4), (5), and (11) determine the
 optimal foreign and domestic prices as func-
 tions of price expectations; the model is
 closed by assuming rational expectations and
 no production subsidies (P-a = -, psa = P)-
 Denote this time-consistent solution by
 (jpC pC).
 PROPOSITION I: The inability to precom-
 mit to the ex ante optimal tariff results in a
 lower world price and a higher domestic price
 of importables. It also leads to lower welfare
 in both countries.
 PROOF:
 Evaluating (11) at the ex ante optimum
 (p?, p?) yields
 (12) a V/P Vy [t? X
 =-tVS t0 = (p?-p 0).
 Thus, assuming Si > 0, d V/l- < 0 at (p,
 5If domestic production decisions are also made
 ex ante (based upon price expectations of po), the ex
 post trade indifference curve will not be GJBH. How-
 ever, it will be tangent to GJBH at B, so the essential
 argument is unaltered.
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 p?), implying -C < -O6 From (8), with dpi
 = dp, dp5 = dp (and p5 = p):
 (13) (dp/dp) = { [ X' - FY /(-S)}
 <0
 assuming no goods are inferior. Thus, pc <
 p? implies pc > p0. Foreign welfare declines
 as p falls, whereas domestic welfare must
 decline as the ex ante tariff yields the global
 optimum.
 Since ex post price changes have only
 demand effects, it is apparent from (3) that
 the ex post foreign export supply curve will
 be everywhere negatively sloped if the for-
 eign compensated price elasticity of demand
 is zero (no substitutability between goods).
 Hence, for this case, the only time-consistent
 solution is autarky! Intuitively, the time-con-
 sistent, no precommitment solution will be
 close to the ex ante optimum when the price
 elasticity of foreign supply is low and the
 demand elasticity large, whereas the equi-
 libria will be "far apart" when foreign supply
 is very elastic and (compensated) demand
 inelastic.
 Thus, the inability of the large country to
 irrevocably precommit to its optimal tariff
 leads to a decline in welfare in both coun-
 tries. This occurs because foreign (domestic)
 producers, correctly anticipating a tariff
 above the ex ante optimum, respond by
 decreasing (increasing) production of F,
 thereby reducing world trade and specializa-
 tion. Naturally, if the large country govern-
 ment could impose some cost (or treaty) on
 itself (or future governments) that effectively
 limited its ability to alter tariffs, this time-
 inconsistency problem could be reduced, or
 eliminated.
 Failing this, it will be in the interests of
 the domestic government to induce foreign
 producers to expand output by precommit-
 ting itself to other policies that will have the
 net impact of raising world prices. One such
 policy is to limit (tax) domestic production
 of importables.
 II. Domestic Production Taxes and the
 Time-Consistent Tariff
 It is well known that (with precommnit-
 ment) the optimal policy for a large country
 entails trade restrictions, but no production
 taxes (MRS = DRT = FRT). However, the
 time-consistent solution described in Section
 I results in an equilibrium in which: MRS =
 DRT> ex ante FRT. Intuitively, then, a
 policy that restricted (taxed) domestic pro-
 duction of importables-thereby encourag-
 ing foreign production-could increase wel-
 fare in both countries.
 The timing of economic decisions, as de-
 tailed in Section I, is modified as follows:
 First, the government announces a price (or
 tax/subsidy) it will pay domestic producers,
 as well as a tariff rate. Next, domestic (and
 foreign) production decisions are made, on
 the basis of producer price expectations.
 Then, the government-assuming precom-
 mitment is not feasible-can revise the tariff
 rate (or production tax/subsidy). Finally,
 trade and consumption decisions are made.
 Note that time-consistency issues do not arise
 with respect to revision of the producer price
 (or tax) in step (iii) since, given the level of
 domestic production, such ex post changes
 merely redistribute domestic income, but
 cannot change output (or domestic " wel-
 fare").7
 The ex ante optimal domestic producer
 price is determined as follows.8 Equations
 6We assume a unique ex ante optimum tariff, and a
 unique, consistent solution for the ex post tariff. In
 general, satisfaction of the SOc for the ex post tariff is
 neither necessary, nor sufficient, to guarantee unique-
 ness. Sufficient conditions for uniqueness, and the SOC,
 are: (i) convex preferences; (ii) concave technology;
 (iii) concave ex post foreign offer curve; and (iv) no
 inferior goods. Details are in the Appendix and an
 earlier version of this paper.
 7If all agents are alike, revisions in the tax-given
 output-have no effect. If agents differ, and other forms
 of lump-sum transfers are not feasible, a social welfare
 function would be required to determine the time-con-
 sistent production tax (and tariff).
 8The ex ante choice of domestic output, the produc-
 tion tax, or the producer price are equivalent instru-
 ments.
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 (4), (5), and (11), in conjunction with perfect
 foresight (pa = p), determine the (time-con-
 sistent) world and domestic prices, and
 domestic income, as functions of the prede-
 termined domestic output level (or producer
 price, pa). Totally differentiating V(y, p)
 with respect to pa, using (7)-(11) yields
 after some simplification
 (14) dV/dpa = Vy [ SS + tS ( dp/dp )
 = 0; 8 (p- ps).
 In (14), 8 represents the (implicit) tax on
 domestic production of importables. Since
 the world price (p) will be inversely related
 to the domestic producer price, ps (posi-
 tively related to the production tax), it is
 apparent from (14) that some production tax
 on importables will be desirable. Denote the
 optimal production tax by 8*, and the re-
 sulting domestic and foreign prices by
 (p*, p *, p*). Then:
 PROPOSITION II: Assume the large coun-
 try cannot precommit to its optimal tariff, but
 it can control (tax or subsidize) domestic
 production. Then, assuming all goods are nor-
 mal and the ex post foreign offer curve is
 concave (increasing FRT):
 (i) An optimal policy entails a tax on
 domestic production of importables that is
 less than the ex post tariff (t* [p* - p*] >
 8* >0).
 (ii) The resulting production tax, tariff
 equilibrium is characterized by
 {ex post FRT= p* MRS > ps*
 DRT > ex ante FRT> p* }.
 (iii) Foreign nations, as well as the domes-
 tic country, gain from the production tax.
 (iv) Nevertheless, the resulting equilib-
 rium is Pareto inferior to the ex ante optimal
 tariff, with higher domestic (consumer) prices
 of importables, and lower world prices (p*
 > pC > po; pC < p* < O).
 PROOF:
 See the Appendix.
 Note that this implies that a large country
 which exports agricultural goods (for which
 production lags exist) could gain by subsidiz-
 ing production of exportables, assuming tariff
 precommitment is not feasible.9
 III. Conclusions
 We have shown that if production lags
 are present and tariff precommitment is
 not feasible, then the time-consistent tariff
 equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the precom-
 mitment equilibrium, and the second-best
 solution will include a production tax on
 importables. Clearly, these conclusions ex-
 tend to any dynamic framework in which
 some imputs are committed before trade de-
 cisions are made.
 An interesting extension would be to in-
 corporate uncertainty into the model. As-
 suming state-contingent policies (tariffs) are
 not feasible, then both ex ante and ex post
 tariffs would be second-best instruments, as
 the ex ante tariff is set under imperfect
 information, whereas the ex post tariffs in-
 volve time-consistency problems. The rela-
 tive advantage of flexibility (deferring tariff
 decisions) should depend upon the degree of
 uncertainty and the elasticity of foreign
 supply.
 APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION II
 Using (4)-(5), the FOC for the ex post tariff (11)
 defines
 (Al) J[ p pa Psa= VY[x+ t ]=O
 The SOC, given (pa, psa), requires
 (A2) A= S
 A -[2( X'- S; )-t( X"- St' + FYSf )] s
 9Since using a production tax and a tariff is equiv-
 alent to using a production tax/subsidy and a con-
 sumption tax, Proposition II implies that the second-best
 policy entails a production subsidy (on importables)
 that is less than the consumption tax. It should also be
 clear that, in this model, the time inconsistency of the
 optimal tariff arises because of the "consumption-tax
 component" of the tariff. I am indebted to an anony-
 mous referee for suggesting this observation.
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 where /3 (slope of domestic compensated demand for
 importables) is negative, and A > 0, if and only if the
 ex post foreign offer curve is concave (i.e., increasing
 FRT, given output). Uniqueness of the time-consistent
 solution (given pa) requires
 di di J
 (A3) , -+ = (-W/13) < O;
 Lap apa
 W- K8 K-( X-'- S_;)( X-'- tFyS'] w~~~~~~~~S
 (A4) K- zi + S'(I + tF Y)]
 K > 0 implies the ex post FRT increases as one moves
 up the ex ante offer curve. Assuming normality, the
 SOC implies uniqueness. Comparative static results are
 derived from (4)-(5) and (A1)-(A4):
 (A5) [dp/dpa I= [(1- FY)Si (X'-Si;)/W] < 0;
 (A6) dpldpsa] [Sf (1-8FY) KI W] < O;
 thus d8/dpa < 0.
 From (14), after substitution and simplification
 (A7) [ d V/dpsa =[VSf/ W]
 [8#K+ ( X'- S_;)(tS_; -8X') =0
 (A8) t* > (t*S;X') > 8* > O
 since X'> S/ at a consistent solution.
 The ex ante FRT, at the consistent tariff/tax solution,
 is
 (A9) FRT= [+(X/X')]
 = [+ {t*( X'_ }
 = * [ (t* S/Y')] < [p*-*
 Hence, as stated, p* > p* > ex ante FRT > p*. From
 (A5) and (A6), 8*>0 p*> pC> po and p* > -c,
 which implies foreign exporters gain from the tax.
 Finally, define -(pa) as the consistent solution to
 (11), given exogenously determined (pa), and define
 (paf) s.t. (fipa) = p?. From Section I, p((pO) < ?;
 using (A5) this implies fi < po. But p0 = ex ante FRT
 at p?0. Hence, p* > ex ante FRT p* > a= -*< pO
 Thus, the production tax/tariff equilibrium is Pareto
 inferior to the ex ante optimum, completing the proof
 of Proposition II.
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